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The Question of Historical Time Today 
Philosophy of history is dead, so we are told. It died multiple deaths in the early 
postwar period, at the hands of both philosophers and historians. In a certain 
sense, it is hardly surprising that proclaiming the end, the death, the unfeasibility, 
the illegitimacy, the impossibility and even the practical perils of the enterprise 
had simply been one of the intellectual priorities of the era. After the horrors of the 
first half of the last century, being skeptical about the idea of a historical process 
leading to a better future seemed the most honest and reasonable thing to do. 
This of course does not mean that philosophy of history ruled the 
intellectual landscape without any criticism up until postwar times. Since its late 
Enlightenment invention, the practice of philosophizing about the course of 
human affairs gathered quite a few adversaries from Friedrich Nietzsche to 
nineteenth-century historians seeking to professionalize and institutionalize their 
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discipline against the backdrop of the way philosophers approached the question 
of history. Yet, postwar criticism of the entire enterprise is not just one wave in the 
long history of voicing concerns, but a moment of spectacular change. Whereas in 
the nineteenth century there were only a few scattered voices raising serious 
objections against a common standard of philosophizing about history, the 
postwar years have turned the tides and criticism of the former standard has 
become the new standard. 
But what exactly is this entire enterprise that postwar intellectuals so 
eagerly proclaimed dead? And why do I refer to history as a modern invention? 
Intellectual historians could point out that there was something like a philosophy 
of history already during Classical Antiquity and the medieval period, not to 
mention Chinese philosophy of history, or the work of Ibn Khaldun. But the target 
of postwar criticism was not Christian eschatology, Ibn Khaldun, Orosius, or any 
Ancient concept of “history.” Its target was the specifically modern idea of a 
historical process in which human and societal betterment plays out, and the 
newly emerging intellectual practice responsible for the invention of such an idea: 
philosophy of history. 
Referring to (philosophy of) history as a modern Western phenomenon 
aligns with the scholarship of Koselleck (2004) about the birth of the temporalized 
notion of history in the period between 1750 and 1850, but goes against the 
secularization thesis of Löwith (1949). By claiming that philosophy of history is 
nothing other than secularized eschatology (a newer version of something old, 
essentially), Löwith underemphasizes the significance of the modern notion of 
history. For even if future-orientation or the expected fulfillment of the ultimate 
purpose of human affairs are patterns present in modern philosophy of history 
and eschatology, the latter does not postulate anything like a course of human 
affairs. In eschatology there is nothing like a process that leads to such fulfillment. 
Change is granted by the Final Judgement, meaning an entry to another world. 
Contrary to this, the great invention of philosophy of history is precisely a 
processual notion of “history,” a conceptualization of the possibility of change 
within the mundane world of human affairs as running a course. 
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In this chapter, I argue that contrary to all rumors, the enterprise of 
philosophy of history is very much alive today, even indispensable. This is of 
course not to say that postwar criticism can be completely disregarded. The 
question is not that of how to return to a discredited philosophy of history which 
invented a processual concept of history with attributes of directionality, 
teleology, inherent meaning and substance in the course of human affairs. The 
question is whether the possibility of change over time in human affairs can be 
conceptualized as “history” without invoking the aforementioned attributes. This 
is no easy question. In fact, it even consists of two distinct but heavily interrelated 
questions: first, whether it is possible to conceive of historical time in other than 
processual-developmental terms; and second, whether such other-than-processual 
temporality can still be “historical” in the sense of retaining the possibility of 
change over time in human affairs. 
The challenge, I believe, lies in answering both questions affirmatively. 
Consider today’s conceptual alternatives to the processual temporality of the 
modern notion of history. They are able to provide answers to the first question 
only at the cost of leaving the second unanswered. Theorizing how the past 
survives, haunts, and has a “presence” in the present most certainly advocates 
novel ways to think about the relationship between the past and the present (Runia 
2006; Lorenz 2010; Bevernage 2012; Tamm 2015: 1–23; Kleinberg 2017). In that, 
such theories offer alternative temporalities to the modern idea of the historical 
process. Yet, inasmuch as they leave the question of the future out of the equation, 
inasmuch as they focus only a relation to the past in which the past either 
permeates or suddenly erupts into the present, these alternative temporalities 
cannot be conceptual alternatives to modern historical time as an overall 
configuration of past, present, and future. 
 Cultural diagnoses of presentism seem to have the adequately broad scope 
to tackle the issue of historical time. François Hartog (2015), Aleida Assmann 
(2013), and Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht (2015) try to understand a new disposition of 
past, present, and future in Western societies, emerging in the last decades and 
replacing the modern time regime. As to the question of how to call the successor, 
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Gumbrecht (2014: xii, 55, 73) repeatedly invokes a yet nameless chronotope, which 
he nevertheless consistently refers to as the “broad present.” What Gumbrecht 
means by this is very close to what Hartog (2015) calls the reign of presentism and 
a presentist “regime of historicity” that has already replaced the future-oriented 
modern one, while Assmann (2013: 245–280) prefers to talk about a time out of 
joint.  
 Naming and different vocabularies aside, the diagnoses accord in their basic 
understanding of the new situation. They are even congruent with theories of the 
present past when they concur on mapping current societal relations to the past 
by investigating the ways in which the past pervades the present and how the past 
cannot let go of. But for cultural diagnoses this is only one side of the coin; the 
other being the relationship to the future. For Hartog, the shift from a future-
oriented regime to a presentist one – in which the sole viewpoint is that of the 
present’s – did not make the future disappear, only made it seem “opaque and 
threatening” (Hartog 2015: 196). The future came to be seen in terms of risks, 
precaution, and responsibility at the same time when the past came to be seen 
“through notions of heritage and debts.” In the view of Hartog (2015: 201), this 
means nothing other than the present has “extended both into the future and into 
the past.” Gumbrecht (2014: 20) echoes these sentiments by saying that “today we 
increasingly feel that our present has broadened, as it is now surrounded by a 
future we can no longer see, access, or choose and a past that we are not able to 
leave behind.” Finally, Assmann (2013: 322) interprets the extension of the present 
as a new concept of the future which revolves around the idea of sustainability as 
the prolonged existence of the already known and familiarized. 
 Altogether, there is something deeply bewildering in all the above approaches 
to historical time. Both theories of the present past and cultural diagnoses seem to 
imply that historical time today is, in one way or another, anything but historical. 
For inasmuch as the past does not go away and takes hold of the present, and 
inasmuch as the future is only the extension of the present, these 
conceptualizations convey a sense of changelessness. But without the possibility 
of further change, without a future different from the past and the present, there 
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is no historical time; there is only an end to historical time in the present. What the 
above theories indicate is that the current condition of Western societies which is 
no longer supposed to change over time is, actually, ahistorical. 
Now, I do not wish to claim that this is what cultural diagnoses explicitly 
and willfully assert. But this is what I think they entail, and I have three objections 
to such entailed ahistoricity as changelessness. The first objection concerns the lack 
of an actual engagement with future prospects in their own rights; not in terms of how 
such prospects are received, but in terms of being mere prospects. Although 
diagnoses even note that the catastrophism of postwar visions of the future has to 
do with recent ecological and technological prospects, their discussion is limited 
to occasional mentions of biotechnology and global warming. They are interested 
in the future inasmuch as it appears threatening, but do not examine the question 
of why and how the future appears as catastrophic and what is the novelty in that. 
Had they asked such questions, they might have found that artificial intelligence 
research, biotechnology, and climate change are perceived today as anthropogenic 
existential risks (Bostrom 2013), that is, risks arising out of human activity and 
threatening with premature human extinction. 
In discussing responses to anthropogenic threats without exploring the 
threats themselves, cultural diagnoses remain inattentive to a handful of critical 
elements: that the prolongation of existence concerns the prolongation of human 
existence as such; that the prospects themselves are prospects of changes; and that 
the changes envisioned lately in the ecological and technological domains are of a 
completely other character than changes promised by the modern time regime. 
Later I will come back to the novel characteristics of prospective changes. What I 
wish to point out here is only that Western societies are most certainly not 
presentist concerning expectations of the future. Quite the contrary: the societal 
expectation of the future involves today previously unimaginable changes and 
transformations in the human condition.  
 My second objection is closely related to the first: existential risk prevention 
concerning worst-case scenarios of human extinction does not mean that nothing changes. 
Calling for preventive measures to avoid the most dystopian visions does not 
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exclude the possibility of other kinds of changes which do not threaten to eradicate 
human life, even as associated with the very same prospects. This leads straight to 
my third point: spectacular changes are, in fact, very prominently envisioned today – 
especially in the technological domain. For instance, transhumanism and 
technologies of human enhancement are often understood today as updated 
versions of familiar Enlightenment ideals of processual human betterment (Alleby 
and Sarewitz 2011: 1–13; Hauskeller 2014; Cabrera 2015; Jasanoff 2016). Whether 
rightly or not, is another question. 
In any event, catastrophism is not the only vision of the future there is. 
Much of today’s technological prospects is anything but cataclysmic and 
dystopian in their self-perception. They can be optimistic and utopian not only 
when they evoke the modern time regime in connection with a retained hope of 
human betterment, but also when they claim to escape its confines. Sometimes 
even transhumanists are not aware of the difference between improving on 
already existing human capacities and aiming at better-than-human capacities 
(Simon 2018c). They tend to claim compatibility with Enlightenment ideals of 
progress in the human condition and simultaneously announce much stronger 
programs “to overcome limits imposed by our biological and genetic heritage” 
(More 2013: 4). Either way, for advocates all this is highly desirable, while a large 
variety of bioconservative criticism (reviewed by Giubilini and Sanyal 2016) finds 
the very same prospects deeply disturbing and dystopian because of the inherent 
possibility of leaving behind a condition that can still reasonably be called human.  
Again, all this poses the question of the new perception of change over time 
in human affairs as entailed by technological and ecological prospects, and, more 
importantly, the question of how they configure the relationship between past, 
present, and future. To answer this question, what needs to be understood first is 
not that technological-scientific and ecological future prospects are catastrophic 
and dystopian. Nor it is that most prospects of technology and science are bright 
in their self-perception, promising to continue the betterment of the human 
condition over a historical process. What needs to be understood is the 
simultaneity of highly optimistic and extremely pessimistic perceptions, 
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oftentimen even concerning the very same future prospects. What needs to be 
understood is the inherent dystopianism even of the shiniest prospects of postwar 
times and the type of perceived change such prospects harbor. 
On the coming pages, I will argue that nothing is better suited for providing 
a conceptual understanding of the current transformation of historical time and an 
emerging sense of historicity of Western societies than a rebranded philosophy of 
history. The first step makes the case for the necessity of such a reinterpreted 
intellectual endeavor. The second step returns to and elaborates on the question of 
the novel type of perceived change in recent ecological and technological 
prospects. Finally, the third step brings the two previous ones together by 
conceptualizing the transformation of historical time as an increasing societal 
invocation of an evental temporality of change against the backdrop of a 
decreasing belief in a processual one.   
 
 
On the Necessity of the Philosophy of History  
The necessity of the philosophy of history is best indicated by two antithetical 
movements in the broadly understood post-World War II period (stretching until 
today). On the one hand, there is a growing skepticism about philosophy of 
history, mostly due to a disbelief about the future as the promise of human and 
social betterment; on the other, there is the survival of philosophy of history in 
disguise. 
To begin with former, inasmuch as the modern concept of history is the 
promise of a better future seen together with the present and the past (history as 
the way leading to the promised future), and inasmuch as this future collapses, it 
simply follows that the concept of history itself, together with philosophy of 
history as the exercise that invents and elaborates that concept, must collapse as 
well. Pointing at the postwar collapse of a promise, however, is not to say that 
Enlightenment thinkers and consecutive philosophies of history were naïve 
believers. Consider the following remark of Kant (1991: 42) from his essay on 
universal history: “despite the apparent wisdom of individual actions here and 
8 
 
there, everything as a whole is made up of folly and childish vanity, and often of 
childish malice and destructiveness.” Like Kant, Enlightenment thinkers and 
subsequent philosophers of history were perfectly aware of the horrors in human 
affairs. They invented the possibility of a better future and the idea of history 
precisely to eliminate these horrors by conceptualizing the possibility of change 
over time in human affairs as history. 
What postwar Western societies renounced was then not a naïve belief, but 
the will to conceptualize change for the better in human affairs in spite of the primary 
experience of horrors. It happened multiple ways. The first thing to point out is to 
remember that the criticism of philosophy of history is not exclusively postwar. 
Although it became the standard attitude only after World War II, Raymond Aron, 
already in 1938 (the date of the first French edition) opened his book on philosophy 
of history by a warning that he does not mean “the great systems of the beginning 
of the nineteenth century, so discredited today” (Aron, 1961: 9). The postwar 
period, however, discredited not merely the “great systems of the nineteenth 
century,” but a large set of interrelated general ideas. The example Horkheimer 
and Adorno’s the Dialectic of Enlightenment (2002) can be wonderfully instructive 
to understand what this means. Their story about the way Enlightenment ideals 
has led to the most gruesome consequences instead of delivering their promise 
might appear as a critique of philosophy of history. But, in fact, it simply reverses 
the assumed directionality of human affairs. If Hannah Arendt (1973: vii) is right 
in claiming that “Progress and Doom are two sides of the same medal,” then a 
comprehensive critique of the entire enterprise of philosophy of history is that 
which aims at abandoning the medal itself, instead of holding up one of its sides 
against the other. In other words, such a comprehensive critique wishes to 
abandon the general idea of directionality, regardless of the specific directions 
assumed by particular approaches. 
Postwar skepticism about the entire enterprise of philosophy of history 
meant skepticism about these most general ideas. Without the intention to provide 
a full overview, I would like to mention a few more, such as the idea of a supposed 
knowledge of the future (regardless of the particular imaginations about how the 
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future may look like); the idea of the self-identical substance of the postulated 
historical process (regardless of the particular shape this substance may take); the 
idea that this historical process follows a discernable pattern inevitably governed 
by an impersonal “force” of history (whatever that force may be); or the idea that 
history has an ultimate and inherent purpose or meaning (whatever that meaning 
may be). To bring these down to concrete examples, sharing with Lyotard (1979: 
xxiv) the postmodern condition as “an incredulity towards metanarratives” 
amounts to sharing a general suspicion about metanarratives of any kind, 
including Horkheimer and Adorno’s. Agreeing with Popper (2002) on the 
impossibility of predicting the future of human affairs based on the past, or 
agreeing with Danto (1985) that configuring a course of history based on an 
illegitimate knowledge of the future results in the illegitimacy of knowledge-
claims on the past, is a general agreement on the illegitimacy knowledge-claims 
about the future. In a similar vein, being convinced by the criticism of historical 
inevitability of Berlin (2002: 94–165) entails a distrust in the general idea of a 
determined historical process on the move. 
Postmodern “end of history” theories, announcing the end of the modern 
idea of history in the sense of movement and directionality (Vattimo 1987; 
Baudrillard 2000: 31–57; Jenkins 1997; many of them analyzed by Butler 1993), are 
of a special kind. One the one hand, they attest to the tendency of outright 
skepticism toward philosophy of history; on the other, they testify its survival by 
tacitly exercise it. For announcing the “end of history” necessarily invokes an 
epochal change as the basic tenet of historical thinking, even if the announced new 
era is that which is supposed to be void of history. Postmodern “end of history” 
theories may nevertheless be very well aware of the ambivalence in their position. 
Vattimo (1987) is at least reflexive enough not only to associate postmodernity 
with the idea of the “end of history,” but also to point out that an “incredulity 
towards metanarratives” itself tells a metanarrative. 
Abandoning philosophy of history and the idea of a historical process is so 
hard that even attempts of abandonment are caught in flagranti of exercising 
philosophy of history. No wonder that survival stories are just as manifold as 
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stories of death. According to Louis Mink, the idea of a Universal History survives 
in historical writing as the presupposition of a past actuality as an untold story. 
There is even a lack of self-awareness about the survival itself in the practice of 
historical studies, inasmuch as the transformed idea of Universal History as an 
untold past actuality “is implicitly presupposed as widely as it would be explicitly 
rejected” (Mink 1987: 188). This psychological edge is also present in Hayden 
White’s story about the necessary presence of a philosophy of history in each piece 
of historical writing. As part of the conclusion of his seminal Metahistory, White 
(1973: 428) claims that “every philosophy of history contains within it the elements 
of a proper history, just as every proper history contains within it the elements of 
a full-blown philosophy of history.” What this means is that regardless of whether 
knowing it or not, no one can write history without relying on a philosophy of 
history (understood as the course of human affairs). It simply lurks in the 
background and tacitly informs the work of historians. 
What is implied by every piece of written history is not an altered version 
of a once celebrated idea as in Mink’s story, but a tacit and necessary appeal to the 
enterprise of philosophy of history. This arguably is a strong claim. I nevertheless 
think that White is right, and not only about the survival of the philosophy of 
history in professional historical studies, but also in various other disciplines. In 
fact, such implied philosophy of history looks the most apparent in theories of 
sociology or political science which intend to make sense of the constitution of the 
world on a longer time scale. These theories of modernization, globalization, 
democratization or secularization – and, for that matter, all “-ization” theories – 
rely on a processual temporality and sketch a historical development over time. 
Such “-ization” theories of course appear as authored by historians as well, 
although they are usually called long-term interpretations instead of being 
labelled as theories. 
 This brings me to the last version of survival stories I would like to introduce: 
the sheer continuation of the enterprise of philosophy of history. Popular scientists 
and public intellectuals – who otherwise are experts in fields of cognitive science, 
physiology or geography – retained the idea of developmental historical process 
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with humankind as its central subject all the while (Diamond 1997; Pinker 2011). 
Lately even popular historians give in to the urge of telling universal histories of 
humanity (Harari 2015), while the big history project – launched by historian 
David Christian (1991) – aims at telling a history of practically everything since the 
Big Bang in a single unfolding story. A more detailed enumeration could include 
deep history, world history, the rise of global history, or the recent fascination with 
telling large-scale Anthropocene stories. All this, I believe, indicates clearly 
enough that the Western world has serious difficulties with effectively abandoning 
both the idea of change over time in human affairs as history and philosophy of 
history as the enterprise conceptualizing such “history.” 
The challenge posed by this situation is just as tough as the situation itself. 
For what needs to be explained and accounted for is both the skepticism towards 
the enterprise of philosophy of history and the actual unwillingness to abandon 
history. Failing to take seriously the skepticism part and merely noting the 
unwillingness to abandon history very likely ends up in promoting a return to 
classical philosophies of history, as if nothing had happened in the last seventy 
years or so. Failing to take seriously the apparent unwillingness to actually 
abandon history disregards the possibility of identifying a socio-cultural endeavor 
that craves for satisfaction, and very likely ends up in advocating the demolition 
of an enterprise that is designed to satisfy that very endeavor. 
Unlike these options, taking seriously both sides the equation would 
simultaneously recognize the indispensability of philosophy of history and the 
implausibility of the way it has been exercised throughout Western modernity. 
What this means is that the indispensability of the philosophy of history is not 
unconditional or naturally given. It is most certainly a conditional indispensability 
that concerns a context-bound and purpose-dependent human endeavor. 
Philosophy of history may vanish and the idea of history could be reckoned with 
one day. But this day comes only as soon as the very purposes and socio-cultural 
needs satisfied by philosophy of history are vanished. For now, this does not seems 
the case. Instead, the enterprise of philosophy of history is still indispensable as the 
best effort of Western societies to conceptualize, thereby understand, account for, and 
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enable change in human affairs; and, consequently, it is indispensable inasmuch as 
Western societies are concerned about change over time. 
In this conditional indispensability, the defining general ideas of modern 
philosophy of history can indeed be abandoned. Conceptualizing historical 
change and historical time does not necessarily have to take the shape of 
conceiving of history as a force or master plan being out there. Instead of 
postulating a historical process with inherent meaning and purpose concerning 
humankind, a rebranded philosophy of history can be fully aware of the fact that 
“history” is its own conceptual invention. But this awareness should not simply 
mean the postulation of the same historical process without determinism and 
inherent purpose in the course of human affairs. It rather has to mean the 
conceptualization of a novel notion of history, arising out of present-day concerns 
about change and perceptions of time as “historical.” Thus the central question of 
such a rebranded philosophy of history is: how to understand historical time when 
even what seem to be utopian remainders of human and societal betterment in technological 
and ecological prospects come out as inherently dystopian? 
 
 
A Novel Sense of Historicity 
In my previous research (Simon 2015; 2018a; 2018b), I have already ventured into 
answering some aspects of these questions. Here I would like to briefly 
recapitulate two of my earlier points and to elaborate on a more general third 
point, which will lead, in the concluding section, to a brief sketch about the 
transformation of historical time. 
The first point is that the type of the perception of change underlying today’s 
prospects is what I came to call unprecedented change. Both optimistic and pessimistic 
expectations of the future in the technological-scientific domain typically concern 
changes which do not merely conceived of as unfolding from past conditions. 
What makes utopian visions of technology inherently dystopian is precisely that 
they are not about the prospective development of already known and familiar 
potentials and yet-underdeveloped capacities. Instead, as indicated in the earlier 
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discussion, technological prospects of artificial intelligence, bioengineering, 
transhumanism, genome editing, and human enhancement entail the possibility 
of the creation of other-than-human beings with greater-than-human capacities. In 
the case of ecological prospects, there is of course nothing like an intentional act to 
bring about anything like this. Nevertheless, the type of change implicit in the 
prospect and the potentiality of humanity engineering its own demise is 
categorically the same in the technological and ecological domains. The challenge 
of the ultimate vision of an inhabitable planet and human extinction as the result 
of anthropogenic climate change is that it defies the continuity of human 
experience (Chakrabarty 2009: 197–198). Defying this continuity, defying the 
possibility of having recourse to a familiar configuration of change, defying the 
possibility of making sense of the future by connecting it to past experiences (on a 
human time-scale) or past occurrences (on a larger-than-human time-scale) along 
a deep processual temporality, is what I call unprecedented. 
 The second point follows from the first: conceiving of change over time as 
unprecedented means conceiving of it as an evental transformation. That which is 
conceived of as unprecedented is expected to be brought about in an instance, in 
the shape of a sudden game-changer event. This of course does not mean that prior 
to the expected event nothing can happen and nothing can change in any way 
whatsoever. This means only that the expected momentous transformation is 
supposed to be brought into effect by such an occurrence identified as a disruptive 
event. My favorite example is that of a technological singularity (Vinge 2013), 
referring to the anticipated creation of greater-than-human intelligence, with 
consequences inaccessible to human cognition (which is the primary source of 
unease and dystopianism in prospects of evental transformations).  
These two points tend toward a third one I would like draw attention to: the 
scope of a rebranded philosophy of history is not limited to human affairs, meaning that it 
is not limited to affairs which are exclusively human. This may be surprising and 
unsurprising at the same time. It is surprising as measured against the focus of 
classical philosophies of history on the human and humanity, while unsurprising 
as measured against the current cacophony of discourses questioning the human 
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in one way or another. Without the intention to introduce all the oftentimes 
radically conflicting views, I would like to mention only a few. 
The manifold discourses on posthumanity/posthumanism are, I believe, 
the best indicators that Western societies envision unforeseen changes today 
instead of being presentist. The most trenchant of all is a technological-scientific 
prospect of posthumanity. It marks a new era by the already mentioned prospect 
of the creation of beings that may be posthuman in the most literal sense. The 
creation of greater-than-human intelligence (Vinge 2013; Bostrom 2014) and the 
aforementioned radical enhancement scenarios advocated by transhumanism are 
the most prominent versions of this technological posthumanity. Then, there is a 
critical posthumanism focused on dismantling humanism as a long-standing 
pattern of thought, questioning its anthropocentrism and human exceptionalism, 
fighting the liberal subject at its center, and trying to renegotiate the human-animal 
divide (Braidotti 2013a; Wolfe 2010; Haraway 2008). Ewa Domanska (2010; 2017) 
already tried to raise awareness of the importance of critical posthumanism for 
historical theory. Then, often oscillating between critical and technological-
scientific versions, there is also the most sophisticated posthumanism of Hayles 
(1999), which nevertheless has more sympathy for the former in arguing that the 
posthuman does not necessarily entail biological alteration.  
None of this is to say that the human is no longer important or that the 
human is no longer a central concern. Despite all claims of anti-anthropocentrism 
in critical posthumanism, it must be clear that the sheer existence of most of these 
discourses is due to the extent to which human beings became a threat to 
themselves in the shape of the anthropogenic risks discussed earlier. Critical 
posthumanists would not call for humility and would not challenge what they call 
human exceptionalism if the human was not appearing more powerful – both in 
creation and destruction – than ever before. Nowhere is this clearer than in debates 
about the Anthropocene, regarding which even Chakrabarty (2017) gives in to the 
otherwise much criticized tendency to talk about the “age of humans.” At the same 
time, Chakrabarty (2015) argues that the anthropos of the Anthropocene debate is 
not a mere reiteration of old conceptions of humanity, but a redefinition of the 
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human within a zoecentric worldview focused on life. Similarly, Domanska (2014) 
situates the Anthropocene with concerns for the wider category of Terrans instead 
of the narrower category Humans, while Latour (2010) has his own wider category 
called Earthlings. 
Again, the list could be continued with far more examples. But the tendency 
is hopefully already displayed: with or without much conceptual innovations, 
both within a narrowly defined historical studies (Chaplin 2017) and an emerging 
transdisciplinary setting (Braidotti 2013b; Domanska 2015; Robin 2018), the scope 
of today’s historicity extends over a world of entangled human/nonhuman affairs. 
 
 
The Transformation of Historical Time: Processual and Evental 
Temporalities 
To avoid any misunderstandings, I am not advocating any of the above views. My 
intention is rather to provide a conceptual understanding of their shared 
thematizations, concerns, and most profound assumptions as our emerging 
historical sensibility. I think that the redefinition of the human/nonhuman world 
as an object of knowledge, the perception of change over time as unprecedented, 
and the expectation of a singular disruptive event to bring about such 
unprecedented change, are integral features of an ongoing transformation of 
historical time. 
  Running the (not really existential) risk of schematization, it seems useful to 
distinguish between a processual and an evental understanding of historical time. 
Changes conceived of along a processual temporality concern changes in the 
condition of a subject in the human world, unfolding against the backdrop of a 
deep temporal continuity. This is historical time as we know it in Western 
modernity. Changes conceived of along an evental temporality concern changes 
in the entangled human/nonhuman world which bring about a previously 
inexistent subject in a non-continuous manner, through unprecedented changes. 
This is historical time as it is emerging in post-World War II societies. The 
transformation of historical time is best understood as the increasing perception 
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of change over time in Western societies along an evental temporality, 
accompanied by simultaneous decrease of expecting change to take place in a 
processual scenario.    
However useful such schematic contrast may be in gaining a conceptual 
understanding of what is at stake in the transformation of historical time, it must 
be clear that actual views are typically less comprehensive and coherent. Just as it 
is not necessary for a processual historical sensibility to exhibit in its particular 
instances all the attributes of an interrelated conceptual toolkit (directionality, self-
identical substance, telos, and so forth), the above individual examples of an 
evental conception of historical time do not necessarily hold or imply all the 
aforementioned three features associated with evental temporality on the 
conceptual level. Not to mention that the two temporalities are often conflated in 
certain discourses. For instance, critical posthumanism implies a processual 
temporality in extending emancipatory concerns of the human world to the 
entangled world of human/nonhuman affairs, although the tectonic 
rearrangement of knowledge it advocates qualifies as unprecedented change that 
does not merely unfold from past conditions as an accumulation of knowledge. 
 Given such blending of concerns and temporalities in discourses and views of 
today, the main question is that of how processual and evental dispositions of 
historical time relate to each other today. To begin to answer this question from a 
bit afar, the first thing to note is that both processual and evental temporalities can 
be labeled as “historical” inasmuch as they configure large-scale change over time 
in the world without the assumption of otherworldly intervention, either divine 
or supernatural. It is nevertheless equally tempting to consider evental 
temporality as the one that brings about other-than-historical change. It would also 
be possible to propose a new and at first perhaps oddly sounding concept for that 
which is other-than-history, and then to contrast it to history and its processual 
time. But there is a way in which the result would be the same: insofar as the 
evental temporality harbored by postwar prospects is not conceived of exclusively 
as a new version of the old historical time, insofar as the occurrence of a novel type 
of perceived change is conceived of as that which threatens to shatter whatever we 
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have previously thought about historical change, it makes no difference if we stick 
with the word history. The sheer fact of referring to “historical” time in the case of 
both a processual and an evental temporality can nevertheless be confusing. But 
we know, to a large extent due to the work of Reinhart Koselleck, that concepts 
tend to shift meanings, even to an extent that meanings associated with a certain 
words and concepts completely dissipate with the emergence of new meanings 
associated with the very same words and concepts. 
At the present moment, this is not (although perhaps only not yet) the case 
with “history.” It rather seems to me that, since sometime around the end of World 
War II, we are living in a period like the one between 1750 and 1850, to which 
Koselleck (2004) referred to as Sattelzeit. By this, Koselleck meant a saddle period 
in which a cluster of interrelated concepts (from the concept of history itself to 
those of revolution or utopia) gained a temporal dimension and thereby new 
meanings, all this resulting in the overall conceptual design of the processual 
historicity of Western modernity. If, as I think, we are in another saddle period of 
substantial changes, it means that old and new understandings of history and 
conceptions of historical time exist alongside each other, and sometimes even 
mingle in particular instances, such as in the case of critical posthumanism. This is 
also why it is better, for now, to consider both processual and evental temporalities 
as being “historical.” 
Until we recognize or affirm the transformation as finished and one that 
irrevocably took place, we cannot even determine its character and settle the 
question of whether the transformation of historical time itself is processual or 
evental. Accordingly, the claim I wish to advance asserts only that a processual 
and an evental historical time can be analytically distinguished in the post-World 
War II Western world. A stronger version of this claim, that I also wish to hold, 
asserts that the evental conception of historical time is gaining prominence at the 
expense of the former ubiquity of the processual conception of historical time. If 
there is an ongoing transformation of historical time, nothing more about its 
character can be said with any certainty precisely because what an ongoing 
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transformation of historical time transforms is very way in which we can talk about 




Alleby B. and D. Sarewitz (2011), The Techno-Human Condition. Cambridge, MA: 
MIT Press. 
 
Aron, R. (1961), Introduction to the Philosophy of History: An Essay on the Limits of 
Historical Objectivity, trans. George J. Irwin, Beacon Press: Boston. 
 
Arendt, H. (1973), The Origins of Totalitarianism, New York: Harcourt Brace and 
Company. 
 
Assmann, A. (2013), Ist die Zeit aus den Fugen? Aufstieg und Fall des Zeitregimes der 
Moderne, München: Hanser. 
 
Berlin, I (2002), Liberty: Incorporating Four Essays on Liberty, ed. Henry Hardy, 
Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Baudrillard, J. (2000), The Vital Illusion, New York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Bevernage, B. (2012), History, Memory, and State-Sponsored Violence: Time and Justice, 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Bostrom, N. (2013), “Existential Risk Prevention as Global Priority,” Global Policy, 
4 (1): 15–31. 
 





Braidotti, R. (2013a), The Posthuman. Cambridge: Polity Press. 
 
Braidotti, R. (2013b), “Yes, There is No Crisis: Working Towards the 
Posthumanities,” International Journal for History, Culture and Modernity, 1 (2): 187–
199. 
 
Butler, J. (1993.), “Poststructuralism and Postmarxism,” Diacritics, 23 (4): 2–11. 
 
Chakrabarty, D. (2009), “The Climate of History: Four Theses,” Critical Inquiry, 35 
(2): 197–222. 
 
Chakrabarty, D. (2015), “The Human Condition in the Anthropocene,” The Tanner 
Lectures in Human Values. Delivered at Yale University, February 18–19. Available 
online: https://tannerlectures.utah.edu/Chakrabarty%20manuscript.pdf 
(accessed 25 March 2018) 
 
Chakrabarty, D. (2017), “The Future of the Human Sciences in the Age of Humans: 
A Note,” European Journal of Social Theory, 20 (1): 39–43. 
 
Chaplin, J. E. (2017), “Can the Nonhuman Speak? Breaking the Chain of Being in 
the Anthropocene,” Journal of the History of Ideas, 78 (4): 509–529. 
 
Christian, D (1991), “The Case for ‘Big History,’” Journal of World History 2 (2): 223–
238 
 
Cabrera, L. Y. (2015), Rethinking Human Enhancement: Social Enhancement and 
Emergent Technologies. Basingstoke: Palgrave. 
 
Danto, A. C. (1985), Narration and Knowledge: Including the Integral Text of Analytical 




Diamond, J. (1997), Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies, New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company. 
 
Domanska, E. (2010), “Beyond Anthropocentrism in Historical Studies,” Historein, 
10: 118–130. 
 
Domanska, E. (2014), “The New Age of the Anthropocene,” Journal of Contemporary 
Archaeology, 1 (1): 96–101. 
 
Domanska, E. (2015) “Ecological Humanities,” Teksty Drugie, Special Issue – 
English Edition, 186–210. 
 
Domanska, E. (2017), “Animal History,” History and Theory, 56 (2): 267–287. 
 
Giubilini, A. and S. Sanyal (2016), “Challenging Human Enhancement,” in S. 
Clarke et al. (eds), The Ethics of Human Enhancement: Understanding the Debate, 1–
24, Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Gumbrecht, H. U. (2014), Our Broad Present: Time and Contemporary Culture. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Haraway, D. (2008), When Species Meet. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press.  
 
Hartog, F. (2015), Regimes of Historicity: Presentism and Experiences of Time. New 
York: Columbia University Press. 
 
Hayles, K. N. (1999), How We Became Posthuman: Virtual Bodies in Cybernetics, 
Literature, and Informatics, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 




Hauskeller, M. (2014), Better Humans? Understanding the Enhancement Project. 
London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Horkheimer, M and T. W. Adorno (2002), Dialectic of Enlightenment: Philosophical 
Fragments, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Jasanoff, S. (2016), “Perfecting the Human: Posthuman Imaginaries and 
Technologies of Reason,” in J. B. Hurlbut and H. Tirosh-Samuelson (eds), Perfecting 
Human Futures: Transhuman Visions and Technological Imaginations, 73–95, 
Wiesbaden: Springer. 
 
Jenkins, K (1997), “Why Bother with the Past? Engaging with Some Issues Raised 
by the Possible ‘End of History as We Have Known It,’” Rethinking History, 1 (1): 
56–66.  
 
Kant, I. (1991), “Idea for a Universal History with a Cosmopolitan Purpose,” in H. 
S. Reiss (ed), Kant: Political Writings, 41–53, Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 
Kleinberg, E (2017), Haunting History: For a Deconstructive Approach to the Past, 
Stanford: Stanford University Press. 
 
Koselleck, R. (2004), Futures Past: On the Semantics of Historical Time, New York: 
Columbia University Press. 
 
Latour, B. (2010), “A Plea for Earthly Sciences.” in J. Burnett, S. Lefferes and G. 





Lorenz, Ch. (2010), “Unstuck in Time. Or: The Sudden Presence of the Past,“ in K. 
Tilmans, F. van Vree and J. Winter (eds), Performing the Past: Memory, History, and 
Identity in Modern Europe, 67–102, Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press. 
 
Löwith, K. (1949), Meaning in History: The Theological Implications of the Philosophy 
of History, Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 
 
Lyotard, J-F. (1979) The Postmodern Condition: A Report on Knowledge, trans. Geoff 
Bennington and Brian Massumi, Manchester: Manchester University Press. 
 
Mink, L. O. (1987), Historical Understanding, ed. B. Fay, E. O. Golob and R. T. Vann, 
Ithaca: Cornell University Press. 
 
More, M. (2013), “The Philosophy of Transhumanism,” in M. More and N. Vita-
More (eds.), The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the 
Science, Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, 1–17, Malden: Wiley-
Blackwell. 
 
Pinker, S. (2011), The Better Angels of Our Nature: Why Violence Has Declined, New 
York: Viking. 
 
Popper, K. (2002), The Poverty of Historicism, London and New York: Routledge. 
 
Robin, L (2018) “Environmental Humanities and Climate Change: Understanding 
Humans Geologically and Other Life Forms Ethically,” WIREs Climate Change, 
9:e499. 
 
Runia, E. (2006), “Presence,” History and Theory, 45 (1): 1–29. 
 
Simon, Z. B. (2015), “History Manifested: Making Sense of Unprecedented 




Simon, Z. B. (2018a), “(The Impossibility of) Acting upon a Story that We Can 
Believe,” Rethinking History, 22 (1): 105–125. 
 
Simon, Z. B. (2018b), “History Begins in the Future: On Historical Sensibility in the 
Age of Technology,” in S. Helgesson and J. Svenungsson (eds), The Ethos of History: 
Time and Responsibility, 192–209, New York: Berghahn. 
 
Simon, Z. B. (2018c), “The Story of Humanity and the Challenge of Posthumanity,” 




Tamm, M., ed. (2015), Afterlife of Events: Perspectives on Mnemohistory, Basingstoke: 
Palgrave. 
 
Vattimo, G. (1987), “The End of (Hi)story,” Chicago Review, 35 (4): 20–30 
 
Vinge, V. (2013), “Technological Singularity,” in M. More and N. Vita-More (eds.), 
The Transhumanist Reader: Classical and Contemporary Essays on the Science, 
Technology, and Philosophy of the Human Future, 365–375, Malden: Wiley-Blackwell. 
 
White, H. (1973), Metahistory: The Historical Imagination in Nineteenth-Century 
Europe, Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press. 
 
Wolfe, C. (2010.), What is Posthumanism? Minneapolis: University of Minnesota 
Press. 
 
 
View publication stats
